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This thesis examines the defining qualities of the retrospective curatorial 
model using The Michael Snow Project, hosted in 1994 by the Art Gallery of 
Ontario and The Power Plant, as a case study. A source of modern conceptions of 
authority, the retrospective employs particular canonization criteria by directing 
curatorial argument to biographical origins. The occasion of the retrospective 
therefore imposes a set of interpretive limitations on artworks whose themes 
problematize authorship, channel elements of chaos or accident, or question 
historical viewing. A critique of three catalogue essays for 
the Project demonstrates how—despite curatorial awareness of the retrospective 
model and various attempts to transcend its structures—these canonization criteria 
shape interpretation. Both the Project’s critical consciousness of this model and 
the varied nature of Snow’s corpus present an opportunity to consider the 
enduring influence of retrospective framing on curatorial discourse, and its 
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1| Introduction 
 
Does the artist paint herself? Is the art’s story her story? We are compelled 
to make sense of the relationship between life and work, to see biography in art 
and art in biography. We assume that the temporal experience of the artist informs 
her oeuvre, and constitutes the thread by which every individual work is 
understood; the result is a sense of an enduring aesthetic comprehensible to both 
creator and observer. But when placed within the chronological and biographical 
construct typical of the institutional retrospective, the criteria for the 
comprehensible risks encouraging a cult of celebrity detrimental to the nuanced 
and intersecting lives and works that make up not just art’s history, but also its 
present. To investigate the modes of authorship operative in the retrospective 
model might provide some insight into the contentious issue of artistic celebrity, 
and the creation of canons; it might shed light on why some biographical details 
are glossed over or exaggerated, why certain artists are more suited to 
retrospective analysis than others, or why the large-scale monographic display 
justifies existing investments and interests in the well-loved artists of both our 
time and the past.  
More importantly, the popular model is also in tension with the very 
nature of the contemporary, described by a general de-centering of art practice, 
and a certain de-historicization and indeterminacy, especially one in which the 
subject is a mutable entity, constantly reconstituted through multiple—even 
infinite—identifications. Despite this, the retrospective persists; it constitutes a 
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closing of analysis in an historical moment that demands its opening. The 
retrospective announces ends—of careers, of lives, and by extension, of artistic 
meanings and interpretive possibilities; it re-centers, re-historicizes, and re-
establishes known artists as origins of artistic genius. Whereas the exhibition 
medium elsewhere presents a platform for critical reform, its retrospective 
iteration ossifies the canon by aligning logical stylistic progress with what is 
perceived to be an equally logical life. The question is not whether the 
retrospective should be cut from the institutional program—indeed, there is 
certainly use in the consolidation of an oeuvre—but how its framing as a model 
bears, often imperceptibly, on curatorial discourse. The identification of the 
retrospective’s mechanisms constitutes potential sites for alternative curatorial 
strategies, both within and outside the retrospective exhibition. In other words, we 
must understand the retrospective as a model with particular functions in order to 
better inform methods for a critical curatorial understanding about the relationship 
between life and work, and to appreciate the limits—and consequences—of 
monographic display. Such understanding contributes to a corresponding critical 
discourse in art history and criticism, which regularly critiques and revises both 
the canon and the ideologies on which the process of canonization is formed and 
sustained. This thesis examines, by way of case study, the retrospective through a 
study of the 1994 Michael Snow Project hosted by the Art Gallery of Ontario 
(AGO) and The Power Plant not merely for its classification as a retrospective, 
but for its unique awareness of the retrospective occasion, its methods of 
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curatorial writing, and its treatment of an artist whose varied oeuvre exists 
between the canon and the contemporary.  
Retrospectives announce the success of artists and proliferate their 
popularity, and The Michael Snow Project is no exception. They are marketed as 
“blockbuster” exhibitions, invoking the language and rhetoric of the film industry, 
and, as art and cultural historian Nicholas Green has observed, rely on the 
“‘tourist’ appeal of known names.”1 There is some ambiguity then around 
whether institutional investments in—and, effectively, the public’s incentive for 
visiting—retrospectives are based in an interest in work or life; following this, the 
question of whether the retrospective model demands a presentation of work as 
life awakens the important problem of biography as it relates to art historical and 
curatorial methods. Is the retrospective necessarily biographical? How does the 
retrospective create and maintain the canon? To what extent is the canon then a 
reflection of the return to biography in the exhibiting of “known names”? These 
questions ask for a consideration of the ways in which institutions characterize 
and canonize artists as authors within a retrospective model.  
While the paradigm of the artist individual is often criticized on the 
occasion of retrospectives, and indeed Green is here critical of specific 
interpretive fallacies common to the monographic art catalogue, rarely do the 
formats of their presentations garner the same level of attention. Interpretive 
methods that direct attention back to the uniqueness of the creative author are 
                                                
1. Nicholas Green, “Stories of Self-Expression: Art History and the Politics of 
Individualism,” Art History 10 (1987), 531. 
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perhaps not a result of particular failings on the part of the art historian or critic, 
but rather discursive parameters inside which interpretation necessarily falls in the 
instance of the monograph. And while Green’s comment about “known names” 
refers to a number of monographic texts about 19th century Barbizon school 
painters, his arguments surrounding the deeply historicized paradigm of 
individualism in art applies to the exhibition format as well. In fact, Green 
reminds us that exhibitions are “key sites” for the proliferation of certain criteria 
for artistic individualism; more often than not, the chronological model of 
biographical display “supplies exhibition organizers with a clear, graspable format 
with which to steer visitors through gallery space,” which is “perhaps the easiest 
of arguments to mount in spatial terms.”2 But crucial to this spatial logic is the 
imperative to formulate a curatorial thesis, one which draws on art historical 
research and interpretation to logically frame an artist’s corpus—and life—as 
itself logical. The solo retrospective or survey is then the curatorial envisioning of 
the monographic text, the literalization of biography at the level of display, and 
therefore implies that the “life” determines the limits of the work considered. 
These limits recover work from earlier criticisms, rearticulate relations between 
works to make arguments for consistency, and support interpretive claims with 
statements made by the author or biographical events in an effort to demonstrate 
narrative continuity. Ultimately, the retrospective narrative attempts to provide a 
degree of access to a life through the organization of art works. The retrospective 
                                                
2. Ibid., 530. 
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model therefore prompts biographical readings of artworks as a means of 
reinforcing already inscribed institutional value, legitimizing both the artist as 
“retrospective-worthy,” and the institution as a cultural investor in the artist.  
The questioning of a naturalized and popular model is also an occasion to 
identify and articulate its operative mechanisms. While the definition of the 
retrospective seems clear, a description of its precise functioning remains 
unformulated. Besides the imperative to question the logic of that which is at once 
popular and under theorized, a specific inquiry into the retrospective’s inner 
workings is also an investigation into the role of criticism in curatorial practice, 
the role of the institution as a creator of authorship, the legacy of creative 
individualism, and the viability of biographical art historical readings into the 
contemporary period. What this study offers is observations of a set of interpretive 
tendencies and slippages, which often lead interpretation to the canonization of 
the artist based on modernist criteria in spite of efforts to redirect away from more 
traditional retrospective views. This analysis contributes to both curatorial 
discourse and art historical methods, because it demonstrates systematically how 
the limits of the retrospective absorb and repackage history according to a 
celebratory or memorializing end, reasserting the exhibition as a site or event 
which attempts to model future conceptions of its subject according to a particular 
agenda. 
 The Michael Snow Project is a case study wherein the curators 
consciously address some concerns of the retrospective model, and so presents an 
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opportunity to see how these interpretive tendencies are manifest, and how they 
determine the character of authorial identity as the exhibition forms it in 
retrospect. Both an example of the model and exemplary in its awareness, The 
Michael Snow Project—specifically, its catalogue essays and curatorial archive—
demonstrates the durability and endurance of the retrospective interpretive 
framework, despite the project’s active attempts to attend to issues about art and 
biography in the retrospective model. The Michael Snow Project is an appropriate 
case study not just for its Canadian context, nor its mere qualification as a 
retrospective. For one, the massive scale and scope of the project—both 
physically and methodologically—presents an amplification of institutional 
investments in biographical readings of art that will help facilitate a close 
analysis. The AGO’s relationship with Snow for the artist’s entire career and its 
role in the project will serve to demonstrate the simultaneous institutional and 
artistic authorships operative in the retrospective. That Snow was given such an 
ambitious retrospective as a living artist is important to this analysis, as it 
demonstrates the function of the model as not only a career-shaping but meaning-
making agent in the formation of a national canon, a process in which the artist 
himself is simultaneously complicit and critical. As an artist in many ways 
between the canon and the contemporary, Snow embodies a certain tension 
between the consolidation—physical as well as historical and theoretical—
required by the retrospective, and the increasing participation of the artist in his 
own institutional presentation.  
 7 
The strength of this case study also lies in its self-awareness as operating 
within the retrospective framework, because at its curatorial inception, The 
Michael Snow Project resisted categorizing itself as such. A preliminary 
exhibition proposal dated July 5, 1989 reads “We [the curators] are planning a 
large scale exhibition that is retrospective in scale but not in character. Three 
curators will be involved in producing separate exhibitions, each which develops 
its own curatorial concept…[emphasis added].”3 This rather enigmatic comment 
(which admittedly only appears in this very early correspondence and nowhere 
else in the AGO’s archive for the project) makes a number of assumptions about 
the retrospective model that prompts further questioning: namely, that there is a 
retrospective “character,” at all, and that whatever constitutes this character is a 
separate consideration from the notion of scale. The second implication is that the 
combination of three curators and their corresponding exhibitions working 
simultaneously under the general scope of the project is what defines this 
dissociation from the retrospective character. That these assumptions may not 
sufficiently describe the nature of the retrospective will become clear in the 
analysis to follow; what is important in this example is the awareness and 
recognition with which The Michael Snow Project curators understood the 
retrospective as a model with certain characteristics at all, and the observed 
conceptual effort to circumvent some of its standards, even when its precise 
                                                
3. Exhibition proposal, submitted by Philip Monk, Louise Dompierre, and Dennis 
Reid for the Art Gallery of Ontario (July 5th, 1989), box E.03.02, Edward P. Taylor 
Library and Archives, Art Gallery of Ontario.  
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definition remains unformed. Indeed, that The Michael Snow Project indirectly 
posed the question of the retrospective’s definition to itself presents an 
opportunity to observe how deeply some of the model’s interpretive tendencies 
go. In this way the project operates simultaneously an example of the model and 
as exemplary in its awareness about the retrospective-as-model. 
Finally, the content of Snow’s corpus exhibits a number of themes and 
concepts that might complicate the modernist retrospective project, and 
demonstrate some of the complex tensions between retrospective viewing and art 
works that “view” critically. As an artist whose work increasingly explores the 
concept of manipulated and re-directed vision, as well as the concepts of selfhood 
and authorship, viewership, fiction, and objectlessness, Snow’s oeuvre itself 
allows further insights into the ways in which the retrospective’s implied 
biographical readings come to bear on postmodern and contemporary themes. 
This analysis will consider the retrospective’s affirmation of authorial identity—
and The Michael Snow Project’s theoretical distancing from such retrospective 
identifications—as it relates to artists and artworks through to the contemporary 
period that attempt to thwart this very convention. This analysis is therefore 
intended neither as a categorical criticism of Snow’s work, nor an evaluation of 
the general success of the project’s curatorial writing. It is, rather, an attempt to 
reveal how the occasion of the retrospective bears on even self-aware curatorial 
analysis, because it insists on a particular construction of authorial identity as 
determined by a decidedly modernist history of exhibitions. In other words, those 
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biographical inflections typical of traditional retrospective viewing resurface with 
equal strength despite active attempts to transcend them. 
An understanding of academic dialogues in theories about the author, 
combined with a brief ideological history of the formation of the museum as 
cultural institution will demonstrate how authorship and the emergence of the solo 
exhibition model were mutually informing processes with major art historical 
implications. Both historical and recent theories on authorship will therefore 
inform a criticism of retrospective interpretive tendencies as they characterize the 
artist as creative origin, whose work expresses personal, inner states. Critical 
histories of modern exhibitionary and collecting logics will situate these analyses 
more firmly in curatorial discourse, while theories around intertextuality and their 
relation to formalist art historical analyses will provide a lens through which to 
consider the rhetoric of some curatorial arguments about specific Snow works in 
the catalogue essays. 
Given the massive scope and scale of The Michael Snow Project, 
including its multiple, simultaneous exhibitions and numerous catalogues with 
essays by notable authors from a range of disciplines, this inquiry limits its 
analysis to three curatorial essays as they appear in one catalogue titled Visual 
Art: The Michael Snow Project published by the AGO and the Power Plant in 
1994. This text examines Snow’s work spanning the period 1951 to 1993 (the 
year preceding the project), and documents a range of media including painting, 
collage, sculpture, photography, film, and sound installation. This particular 
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analysis will focus on the theses put forth by curators Dennis Reid, Philip Monk, 
and Louise Dompierre, and will exclude for the most part the arguments put forth 
by catalogue editor, filmmaker, and curator Jim Shedden in the catalogue 
Presence and Absence: The Films of Michael Snow 1956-1991, as well as 
Music/Sound: The Performed and Recorded Music/Sound of Michael Snow, Solo 
and with Various Ensembles, His Sound-Films and Sound Installations, and 
Improvisation/ Composition from 1948 to 1993, edited by Michael Snow, and 
Collected Writings of Michael Snow, published along with the other catalogues in 
the series. While Shedden’s text provides a comprehensive chronology of Snow’s 
highly celebrated medium, the essays by Monk and Dompierre include 
discussions of several of his major filmic works in the context of other visual 
explorations by the artist, which provide a more general art historical analytic 
grounding better suited to the nature of an argument about curatorial 
interpretation. The exclusion of Music/Sound—again, a result of structural 
limitations, and a general focus on the visual—nonetheless acknowledges that 
Snow’s musical career is integral to and in many ways inseparable from his career 
as an artist. The three chosen texts are also significant in their respective 
reflections of the conceptual origins of the Michael Snow Project, first proposed 
by Dompierre and developed primarily as a dialogue between the curator and 
Monk and Reid at the AGO. This dialogue—discernable by way of 
correspondence in the AGO archives—forms both the conceptual bases of the 
three resulting exhibitions and their corresponding essays, but also the 
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overarching objectives of The Michael Snow Project in its entirety. Curatorial 
interpretive tendencies are, in addition, more plainly inferred from textual 
explanation than their more distilled, educational translations may be at the level 
of didactic display. Certainly, logistical considerations remain relevant and 
important to the retrospective; some of these details feature in the curatorial 
essays, and the archives offer a wealth of information about logistical curatorial 
decision-making, but the catalogue essays remain the focus of the inquiry insofar 
as they reveal more explicitly the interpretive slippages mentioned. 
 The following thesis is organized according to independent analyses of 
each essay. First, a literature review on author theory situates the retrospective in 
both a general cultural understanding of authorship as well as its specific relation 
to art history. A following chapter makes an argument for the modernist 
underpinnings of the 20th century art institution, and introduces the format as a 
model with particular ideological investments. Separate chapters devoted to the 
essays by Reid, Monk, and Dompierre, respectively, are arranged both according 
to their appearance in the catalogue and chronologically in each of the temporal 
sections of Snow’s career that they investigate. The final chapter consolidates 
these findings, and reintroduces the example of The Michael Snow Project and the 
retrospective model generally to contemporary concerns about the problem of 
“ego” in exhibitions and curatorial essays as sites that construct artistic authorship 
based on particular, historically determined criteria. This section offers some 
theoretical perspectives that revisit the subject of authorship as a space where both 
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artists and their audience can question subjectivities, which might attend to and 






















2| Literature Review – Author Theory 
Although the historical development of the concept of the author might be 
traced back as far as early humanism, the discursive dismantling of the term is 
usually attributed to Roland Barthes’s 1967 poststructuralist essay “Death of the 
Author.”4 A “declaration of radical textuality,”5 Barthes’s text questioned the 
authority of the writer in delimiting interpretive boundaries, and by association 
the cult of heroized individualism that he felt had problematically defined history 
well into the 20th century.6 Characterizing the author as an oppressive “tyranny,” 
Barthes theorized that the assignation of authors to texts imposes strict and 
controlling limits on its interpretive possibilities, “to furnish it with a final 
signified, to close the writing.”7 “Death of the Author” instead privileges language 
over authorial voice, thus destroying the notion of author as unified origin or 
creative source.8 Barthes’s essay would in its critique of the literary author also 
imply a critique of authority generally,9 and this radical skepticism would lend 
itself to later poststructuralist, postmodernist, and neo-Marxist discourses.  
 Responding to these concerns (although, not by name – appropriate 
perhaps given the nature of Barthes’s position on authorship) and critical to the 
dialogue about author theory was French philosopher Michel Foucault’s 1969 
                                                
4. Roland Barthes, “Death of the Author,” in Séan Burke, ed. Authorship: From 
Plato to Postmodernism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 1995. 
5. Andrew Bennett, The Author (The New Critical Idiom) (New York: 
Routledge), 2005, 11. 
6. Ibid., 12. 
7. Barthes in Burke, 128-9. 
8. Ibid., 127. 
9. Michael Moriarty, Roland Barthes (Cambridge: Polity), 1991, 101. 
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lecture “What Is An Author?” In it, Foucault more closely examines the historical 
emergence of the concept of authorship in the Middle Ages, supported later by 
Early Modern European epistemologies including French rationalism, English 
empiricism and an ideological move toward humanism generally.10 Foucault 
interrogates the act of asking about the concept of authorship itself, and questions 
not simply the consequence of authorial dependence but how and why authorship 
operates ideologically. While he is aligned with Barthes in the belief that the 
author conceived as a stable originary force or entity is a historical myth to be 
dismantled, he uses the term “author function”11 to more directly describe the 
relationship between a writer and her text, as it allows for a theoretical 
dissociation of the writing body from the writer-as-author e.g. as she enters a 
certain institution or social discourse. So whereas the act of writing for Barthes is 
one of self-obliteration and metaphysical “death,” it is for Foucault a continuous 
process of loss in which “the space left empty by the author’s disappearance” also 
constitutes an “opening,” one which demands further analysis—a space where 
ideological contexts reconstitute authorship according to its evolving criteria for 
authority.12  
                                                
10. Pierre Macherey, “Creation and Production,” in Séan Burke ed. Authorship: 
From Plato to Postmodernism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 1995), 230. 
11. Michel Foucault, “What is An Author?” Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and 
Sherry Simon in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 125. 
12. Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?” trans. Josué V. Harari in Textual 
Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. Josué V. Harari (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press), 1979, 145. 
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 Aligned with this liberation of the text from author-determined meanings 
is the concept of intertextuality (or intertextualité) in semiotic theory developed 
primarily by the work of Julia Kristeva (Desire in Language: A Semiotic 
Approach to Literature and Art, 1969) who builds on Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept 
of “heteroglossia” as explained in the 1934 text Discourse in the Novel. 
Intertextuality “denotes [a] transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into 
another;” the intertext, in other words, supposes that no texts operate as static 
“signs,” but rather as “surfaces” upon which other texts and their meanings 
converge and intersect.13 All texts, therefore, are intertextual. Jacques Derrida’s 
Of Grammatology (1967) puts forth a similar notion of différence—or 
indeterminacy—of writing, perhaps best articulated by his phrase “there is 
nothing outside of the text,”14 and is often quoted in relation to Kristevian textual 
critiques. Kristeva’s theorization corresponds to Barthes’s, although the latter 
relies more heavily on the agency of the reader as the location of textual unity.15 
Later 20th century critiques like that of Séan Burke propose a “return” of the 
                                                
13. Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New 
York: Columbia University Press), 1984, 59-60. 
14. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158.In 1978, Edward Said famously 
supported a Foucauldian definition of textuality over those proposed by Kristeva and 
Derrida, precisely because it interprets institutional and ideological associations as 
necessarily linked to the text. The free circulation of the text must therefore be 
understood as an unattainable ideal given the restrictive forces of power structures, which 
are always subject to the “hegemony of dominant culture.”  (See Said, “The Problem of 
Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions” in Critical Inquiry 4 (1978), 673-714). 
15. Barthes, “Death of the Author,” 148. 
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author by the very announcement of her death;16 the author in Burke’s view is 
also responsible for making her intentions explicit to facilitate interpretation, and 
this presents itself as not only a theoretical but ethical demand on the part of both 
writer and reader.17 
 More recent scholarship on the subject revisits these now historical 
dialogues to recover them from oversimplifications. Andrew Bennett—in his 
survey of the role of the author in critical theory—introduces the subject to 
feminism and historiography, and looks to extend more strict notions of 
“collaborative” authorship as the normative authorial mode despite the myth of 
unity. Bennett goes so far as to suggest that the question of authorship is the 
essential question behind a perceived crisis in literary—and perhaps, art—
criticism; it is the uncanny “otherness” of the author that fuels disciplinary 
anxiety.18 Works like Jane Gallop’s Deaths of the Author return to the “erotics” of 
Barthesian critique and is a “reconsideration of the death of the author in the era 
of queer theory.”19 Here the fantasy of “touching” the deceased author’s body 
through the text is the “friendly return” of the author; this erotic proximity 
presents a non-linear, non-hierarchical, queer temporality where the conversation 
between reader and writer is one of mutual affection and dependence. A 
                                                
16. Séan Burke, The Death and Return of the Author, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1992), pg. 77. 
17. Maebh Long, “Séan Burke (2009) The Ethics of Writing: Authorship and 
Legacy in Plato and Nietzsche,” review in Culture Magazine (June 2009), 1-2. 
18. Bennett, The Author, 127. “The condition of literary criticism and theory, the 
condition on which criticism and theory are undertaken, the condition even of reading, is 
this crisis…of literature, this uncanny, undecidable author.” 
19. Jane Gallop, The Deaths of the Author: Reading and Writing in Time 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 5. 
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corresponding theorization of “cybertextuality” explains textual operations as a 
similar interaction between an author as “sender” and reader as “receiver” in new 
media contexts; in this formulation, user feedback partially comprises and 
“completes” the sent message, implying the necessarily indeterminate nature of 
authorship and its increasing precariousness in the digital age.20 
And so while the treatment of the author continues to pervade matters of 
literary and cultural criticism, it is perhaps the Foucauldian reading of the author 
as ideologically constituted that continues to characterize the current state of 
scholarship on the subject. Indeed, many more recent scholars have recovered 
both Barthes and Foucault from essentializing criticisms which attempt to 
dramatize their abolishment of the author; later work on the subject by Barthes 
indicates that the author does indeed “return” or “figure” in the text as a function 
of a reader’s desire. Increasingly, the question is then not whether the author 
should or does feature into matters of textual interpretation, but precisely how she 
appears as a product of this desire, ideological structures surrounding the 
conditions of reading, and related institutional power structures. This 
characterization of authorship as it is taken up in various disciplines forms the 
basis of my inquiry into the retrospective curatorial model. 
Following from these mid-century interrogations of texts, authors, readers and 
critics is an almost concurrent analysis in art historical discourse of the concept of 
the artist as an individual, the creative origin of an artwork. Whereas many agree 
                                                
20. Ian Lancashire, Forgetful Muses: Reading the Author in the Text (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), 101. 
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that the cult of the artist was established with Giorgio Vasari’s Lives of the Artists 
and bolstered by the individualism of Renaissance humanism, the “problem” of 
biography in art historical interpretation itself grew from these aforementioned 
poststructuralist inquiries. But the question in this discipline adds a layer of 
complexity since the life of an artist as inextricable from work is, as Charles Salas 
has stated, essential to the “career-building” logic of the art world (that is, despite 
theoretical reservations) in which the association is essential to success in a “post-
humanist” understanding of art and its makers.21 Art historical questioning of life 
and work also draws regularly and liberally from Barthes, Foucault, and others 
writing in the realm of literary and cultural theory, but also produces discipline-
specific scholarship surrounding the question of biography and intentionality in 
art interpretation. 
Much of this criticism forms itself around a dismissal of the Warburgian 
tradition (Aby Warburg, 1886-1929) of art history which attempts to “explicate 
mentalités”22 or collective states of mind from a work’s formal qualities. The 
                                                
21. Charles Salas, “Introduction: The Essential Myth?” in The Life and the Work: 
Art and Biography, ed. Charles Salas (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2007), 1-2. 
22. Ibid., 10. The concept of mentalités comes from the French Annales School 
of history, founded by Marc Bloc and Lucien Febvre in the 1920s, with the term itself 
introduced by the School’s third generation of scholars in the 1960s (Robert Mandrou, 
Jacques Le Goff, and Georges Duby). Mentalité describes a historiographical 
methodology, which combines biographical details as a means of constructing a 
collective social view toward historical moments. Often, the extrapolation of popular 
mentalités happens via individual case studies, where a specific person’s experience is 
used as a microcosmic, representative experience of the many. This non-Marxist, 
materialist social view of history looked to the experiences of “ordinary” people to reveal 
details about societal relations. The Warburgian tradition of social art history looked to 
artists and their works as similarly representative of shared historical mentalities. See 
Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to 
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assumptions implied in this method, while certainly important to social history 
and cultural studies, are more precarious in their art historical applications since it 
seems to allow the art historian or critic to “read into [the work] what he has 
already learned by other means, or what he believes he knows, and wants to 
‘demonstrate.’”23 Those scholars of the mid-20th century, equipped with 
Barthesian criticism, were skeptical; to link formal qualities to an artist’s 
disposition was, at best, speculative. Whether an artist’s stated intention is 
relevant to art historical interpretation is also a concern for the discipline of art 
history. Michael Baxandall’s celebrated Patterns of Intention (1986) 
acknowledges the practical connection between an artist’s gesture and what is 
formally observable in a work of art, but cautions against any dogmatic reliance 
on such information as indicative of expression. Others like J.R.R Christie and 
Fred Orton wish to retain the usefulness of this relationship so as not to limit 
interpretive possibilities; they posit that critics and art historians possess a special 
right to locate expressive qualities in a work of art “with reference as needed to 
the life.”24 This reading echoes the conception of authorship that is skeptical of 
the radical formalist consequences of post-structuralism, opting to consider the 
artist a plural and multiple figure rather than eradicated or irrelevant.25  The logic 
of the text that is said to have launched New Criticism, William K. Wimsatt Jr. 
                                                                                                                                 
the Postmodern Challenge (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press), 1997. 
23. Carlo Ginzburg in ed. Charles Salas “Introduction,” The Life and the Work: 
Art and Biography (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2007), 11. 
24. Salas, “Introduction,” 12. 
25. Ibid. See also J.R.R Christie and Fred Orton, “Writing on the Text of the 
Life,” Art History 11 (1988), 544-64. 
 20 
and Monroe C. Beardsley’s “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946), was quickly 
translated to art history by Clement Greenberg and others as a justification for 
strict formalism; this tendency was—at least in the category of poetry from which 
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s text originated—criticized as being a “vulgarized” 
extension of New Criticism.26 The authorship “problem” similarly presents a 
difficulty to feminist scholarship and art history specifically, for while the criteria 
for originality in authorship is certainly a function of patriarchy, the desire to re-
inscribe and celebrate female authors constitutes a large part of feminist historical 
revisionism,27 while strict formalism denies the important functions of anecdote, 
biography, and ownership in feminist discourse. 
The issue is also inextricable from the history of the critic, connoisseur, 
and academy and therefore also strongly linked to class insofar as it denotes the 
knowledge set that is associated with connoisseurship.28  It is (and has historically 
been) the case that to connect with the artist in some way is in the collector’s best 
financial and class interest; it is therefore also valuable to demonstrate how a 
particular work renders an artist visible as a personality within a collector’s social 
and professional circle. From this investment emerged—first in 19th century 
France—the biographically oriented art historical method in which the artist’s life 
is understood as a coherent entity and origin of the oeuvre—a “rubric” around 
                                                
26. Ibid., 7. 
27. Ibid., 14. 
28. Ibid., 10. Warburg wrote that the biographically driven history of art was 
inextricable from “the properties classes, the collector and his circle.” Draft of a letter 
from Aby Warburg to Adolph Goldscmidt, August 1903, quoted originally in E.H. 
Gombrich, Aby Warbug: An Intellectual Biography, cited in Salas, Life and Work, 9-10. 
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which curators, connoisseurs, historians, and the public evaluate creative 
excellence.29 This convention is famously criticized by the art historian George 
Kubler, whose 1962 text The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things 
views biographical pieces of information as merely “way stations” which deny the 
actual historical nature of artistic traditions as they extend far beyond the temporal 
limits contained within an artist’s life (and death).30 
Like its concurrent investigations in critical, cultural, and literary theories, 
the artist-as-author question remains contentious, if generally approached with 
skepticism. Again the question becomes not about whether biography or 
intentionality should feature in matters of interpretation, but that the nature and 
the treatment of biographical information do. A series of symposia at the Getty 
Research Institute between 2002 and 2003 on the subject of biography occasioned 
the consolidation of a series of essays into a book (published in 2007) under the 
title The Life and the Work: Art and Biography, in which editor Charles Salas 
admits that “the question of the life and the work survives even in realms declared 
hostile to it.”31 The institutional and disciplinary contexts of the use of 
biographical information then demonstrate a methodology on the part of the 
historian, critic, or curator, an interpretive lens itself determined by the particular 
demands of a given project. It is also understood as a function of particular 
ideological and (certainly in the case of curatorial practice) economic concerns 
                                                
29. Ibid., 9-10. 
30. George Kubler, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 6. 
31. Salas, “Introduction,” 8. 
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which depend on certain figurations of artistic authority to sustain their structures; 
these are the very concerns about class and identity politics that are often 
conspicuously absent from monographic treatment of artists, even where 




















3| The Retrospective as Model and Modernist  
The unifying principle of the solo retrospective is the fact that one author 
has created its contents; this fact is used then as an agent of cohesion. The 
retrospective is often large in scale, hosted by a major institution, and celebratory 
or memorial in nature. The retrospective is also decidedly historical in its 
analysis—indeed, the term itself indicates a literal looking back—and across—
time.32 The term is both adjectival and nominative—a description of the nature of 
the looking and the designation that names the display or event itself. The value in 
staging the retrospective is to show that artists are both consistent and that they 
have developed: consistent in the sense that they are consistently admirable or 
observably, legibly “characteristic” across time, but distinct enough that they are 
presented as innovative in relation to their contemporaries. The artist who gets a 
retrospective is also then a very particular kind of creative author whose body of 
work permits a certain set of interpretive criteria. Historically, these criteria and 
their corresponding model of monographic display are rooted in the modernist 
inception and construction of the 20th century art institution. It is therefore 
essential to consider the retrospective as a modernist model in order to associate 
                                                
32. Whereas the first known use of the term “retrospect” to refer to a survey of 
past time or events is generally traced to mid-17th century Europe, its usage as a noun to 
refer to curatorial presentation (i.e. “a retrospective”) surfaces only in 1932, in an 
American context. This temporal discrepancy and shift in usage corresponds with the 
imperative of projects of modernity to describe historical organizational logic in the case 
of the earlier usage, and its application at the inception of modernism in art, with the 
American institution “literalizing” time via individual artists in the later usage. The 
Barnhart dictionary of etymology, ed. Robert K. Barnhart and Sol Steinmetz (1988), s.v. 
“retrospect.” 
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its interpretive frameworks with the concurrent but evolving critical 
understandings of authorship mentioned earlier. 
And while it is widely understood that the 20th century art institution finds 
its roots in various modernist projects (even deeper roots in colonial ones) and 
continues to participate in and refer to this history, there is of course variation in 
methods of display as they have changed to suit shifts in modes of perception, 
institutional mandates, art historical scholarship, and new art forms right up to the 
contemporary period. In other words, because the institution is an enactment of 
power systems, it is also necessarily one of reform.33 Indeed, there are very few 
curatorial methods or models of display that have persisted throughout this 
(modern) history, with the exception of the popular model analyzed here: the 
retrospective. It may be obvious that this particular model—in its historical 
persistence and endurance—is, in its interpretive implications, a modernist34 one 
not only by virtue of its inextricability from the history of exhibitions as they 
relate to the project of modernity, but in the artist-as-individual paradigm as well. 
                                                
33. Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics (New 
York: Routledge, 1995) 90, 97. “The museum…has been constantly subject to demands 
for reform…characterized by two principles: first the principle of public rights sustaining 
the demand that museums should be equally open and accessible to all; and second, the 
principle of representational adequacy sustaining the demand that museums should 
adequately represent the cultures and values of different sections of the public…The 
public rights demand is produced and sustained by the dissonance between…the 
democratic rhetoric governing the conception of public museums as vehicles for popular 
education and…their actual functioning as instruments for the reform of public manners” 
(90). 
34. Although the terms are of course historically linked, “modernity” here refers 
to the Enlightenment era constructions of human progress in the evolutionary theme 
described, whereas “modernist,” “modernism,” and “modern art” refer more specifically 
to these concepts as artists, authors, collectors, and curators take them up as subjects in 
response to modernity’s projects the 20th century. 
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As an oft-used model of display it then also comes to represent a continually 
reasserted type of modernist curatorial argument alongside (and perhaps despite) 
alternative models that are explicit in their turning away from more traditional 
exhibitionary histories. 
Literature concerning the ideological underpinnings of the modern 
museological institution consistently regards certain historical epistemological 
shifts as foundational to the modernist project as it was communicated at the level 
of display; namely, those shifts as they were a function of political power in the 
wake of the French Revolution, which “created the conditions of emergence for a 
new “truth,” a new rationality, out of which came a new functionality for a new 
institution, the public museum.”35 This functionality was characterized by 
“rationalist principles of classification” insofar as these principles were able to 
support a project of public and democratic education, at once critical of the 
outmoded power structures of the ancien régime and instrumental to “the 
collective good of the state.”36 More specifically, this logic was evolutionary, with 
a program of progress, ideological advancement, and national superiority 
determining collection, display, and pedagogy.37 
Following Eilean Hooper-Greenhill’s argument about these institutional 
origins, and in combination with Michel Foucault’s concept of shifting historical 
                                                
35. Eilean Hooper-Greenhill in Tony Bennett, “The Political Rationality of the 
Museum,” The Birth of the Museum (New York: Routledge, 1995), 89. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Bennett, The Birth of the Museum, 96. 
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épistèmes,38 Bennett describes how the logic with which objects were collected 
and displayed was reflective of and contributive to prevailing systems of 
knowledge. An essential transition for Foucault (and for Bennett) is from the 
taxonomical arrangement of objects favoured by the neo-classical épistème to 
their being “inserted within the flow of time, to be differentiated in terms of the 
positions accorded them within evolutionary series.”39 This new épistème and 
corresponding application by way of display in the European museum was 
indicative of a decidedly “modern” conception of progress, whereby objects 
understood and organized temporally were evidence of civilization’s inevitable 
progress toward innovation and improvement. The shift is for Bennett an essential 
one in characterizing the modern museum; not only did a temporal logic allow for 
the narrativization of progress, but it also placed the public “as both the 
culmination of the evolutionary series laid out before it and as the apex of 
development from which the direction of those series…was discernable.”40 In the 
arrangement, the viewing public was the perceived agent of progress and the 
evolutionary result. The museum thus served as a discursive space in which an 
evolutionary logic could inform and support other disciplines (especially art 
history), a space which in turn formed a “totalizing order of things and peoples 
                                                
38. The Foucauldian épistème is a historically determined “epistemological field” 
in which the possibility of knowledge within a given culture, epoch, or era is contained. 
Épistèmes limit the conditions for rationality and order, forming the basis of any logical 
project within them. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge Classics, 
orig. 1966, 2002 edition), xxii. 
39. Bennett, The Birth of the Museum, 96. 
40. Ibid., 97. 
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that was historicized through and through.”41 Such epistemological development 
primed the museum for an increasingly prevalent conception of the individual 
artist as cultural hero,42 and later for the reception of individualized narratives of 
artistic progress, which fit comfortably within this greater evolutionary narrative 
propounded by the modern museum. Just as the visitor is by this logic meant to be 
understood (and to understand his or herself) as both apex and culmination of 
progress, so is the artistic author increasingly understood within an evolutionary 
temporal framing as an embodied example of individualized civility.43 Select 
artists, in other words, could embody the notion of progress at the individual 
level. The retrospective was a mode of display that could combine a particular 
vision of artistic heroism with the narrative of progress espoused by the modern 
museum as its epistemological foundations. The inextricability of biographical 
display from institutionalized modernism foreground the retrospective as an 
interpretive (and physical) model that serves to orient institutional curatorial 
practice to the modernist project despite simultaneous processes of reform to 
which Bennett refers.  
Scholars like Jeremy Braddock, have highlighted how integral this 
understanding of artistic individualism was in the later transformations of 20th 
century collections into American modern art institutions, which would operate as 
                                                
41. Ibid. 
42. James Hall, The Self-Portrait: A Cultural History (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2014), 75. 
43. Nicholas Green, “Self-Expression,” 530. Green argues that the “celebration of 
the particularity of artists” became integral to cultural policy in 1880s Europe, as it 
promoted “an ideological programme condensing stern moral and patriotic values, 
meritocracy and individual physiological variation.” 
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paradigmatic models for later iterations across the continent. Modernism was in 
the case of collection and display less an enactment of an agreed upon set of 
values or definitions than it was an opportunity for collectors to define publicly an 
otherwise unstable term with regard to art practice. In his recent book Collecting 
as Modernist Practice, Braddock looks to the practice of collecting in early 20th 
century America as essential in defining and shaping notions of modernism and 
its institutionalization. What he observes as the “collecting aesthetic” of the 1920s 
served to not only document various interpretations of modernism but also to 
prime and “create the conditions of modernism’s reception.”44  Braddock centers 
his argument—which deals simultaneously with art collections and edited poetry 
anthologies as “collected” works—around what he calls “provisional 
institutions...a mode of public engagement modeling future” that had power to 
create the social conditions for both a public engagement with art and creative 
production within American artistic communities themselves.45 A comparative 
analysis of the inception and institutionalization of the Philips Memorial Gallery 
in Washington, DC and the Barnes Foundation in Philadelphia demonstrates for 
Braddock how viewing museums as “authored” collections (and indeed, a 
collection of “authors”) provides a lens through which to deconstruct 
contemporary curatorial practice in those institutions that find their origins in 20th 
century modernism, and their ideological roots in 18th century modernity. 
                                                
44. Jeremy Braddock, Collecting as Modernist Practice (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2012), 2-3. 
45. Ibid., 3. 
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Braddock’s investigation of the modern art collector begins with the example 
of Duncan Phillips and his Phillips Memorial Gallery in the 1920s. The collector 
was arguably the most successful in anticipating the later, popularity of modernist 
artworks, and is notable for his ability to maintain his collection in the same 
location even after his death. For Braddock, Phillips and his social-aesthetic 
agenda are exemplary of the collector’s control of modernism’s reception and his 
corresponding control of the term itself.46 By positioning himself as a necessary 
“interpreter and navigator”47 who mediated the public’s experience with art, 
Phillips modeled his exhibitions on the ideal of the “domestication” of modernism 
as a de-alienating technique that would engage his public. His mode of display 
(exhibiting artworks alongside domestic objects, arranged in Phillips’s mansion) 
was imperative for Phillips, as it served to filter the potentially radical, anarchic 
modes often associated with artist collectives through the institution; he similarly 
solicited an audience that would “feel at home” in his galleries so as to promote 
sociability among visitors.48 Phillips also lobbied for an integration of art 
education into the university system, with the object of producing both a new 
generation of art appreciators and an inspired community of young, aesthetic 
innovators. 
The collector’s argument about the modern was, Braddock observes, 
fundamentally rooted in the “artist-as-individual” paradigm where a trans-
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47. Ibid., 74. 
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historical tradition of formal innovation and arts patronage supported the artist as 
an embodiment of the combined value of aesthetics and social change. Philips’s 
displays celebrated individual insight that formally broke with tradition rather 
than follow a temporally linear progression of artistic development as exemplified 
by collectivities or movements. This “individualist theory of modernism” was 
enacted in Philips’s insistence on a “domesticated” scale (literally displayed in 
Philips’s home) and therefore democratic mode of display, where his modernist 
message could be publicly consumed in what Braddock calls a “program of 
perception.”49 The Memorial Gallery could then validate the importance of the 
collection, formalize a particular notion of modernity, and disseminate this 
definition so as to inform future public understandings of the term. Philips’s 
success in this collecting-turned-curatorial model is best reflected in that which 
informed practices of collection and display for Alfred Barr’s Museum of Modern 
Art, where the celebration of artistic individualism contained in a public 
institution formed the framework for the pervasive 1950s American definitions of 
modern art.50 
Braddock compares Philips with his collecting contemporary Albert Barnes, 
whose foundation displayed modernist works on a slightly different social agenda, 
but was similarly “authored” as per Braddock’s thesis. Whereas Philips argued for 
his domesticated art experience, Barnes’s vision was decidedly educational, 
systematic and, according to Braddock, also “privately Freudian” in its heavy 
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drawing from the theories of aesthetic philosopher John Dewey.51 Although 
democratically accessible, viewership was for Barnes a learned skill, and 
therefore had to be mediated by an educational institution. Braddock is 
specifically interested in Barnes’s “wall ensembles,”52 which in their formal 
arrangements reflected corresponding formal qualities in the chosen artworks. 
Braddock works beyond this purely formal logic, however, drawing on the 
symbolic register to demonstrate that these arrangements did also follow a more 
insidious thematic logic in which Braddock had inscribed meanings based in the 
deeper, emotional states of both the artists selected and the collector. Of particular 
note in both the case of Phillips and Barnes is Braddock’s observation of the 
collectors’ “signature” embedded in display itself. For Phillips, this takes the form 
of an Egyptian bust of the culturally progressive and aesthetically innovative 
patron of the arts—Akhenaten—shown among modernist works, the inclusion of 
which Braddock argues confirms Phillips’s self-perception as being a part of a 
great lineage of patronage. Comparatively, Barnes includes a portrait sketch of 
himself in a room of “primitivist” paintings and African objects that imply themes 
of impotence, or failed paternity in their juxtaposition.53 Telling, too is 
Braddock’s observation that these signatory practices foreshadowed the respective 
success and failure of each collector in their project to institutionalize in the long 
                                                
51. Ibid., 111. 
52. Ibid., 137. 
53. Ibid., 154. Braddock remarks that some of Barnes’s curatorial inclusions are 
signatures that comment both consciously and unconsciously on impotence; indeed, the 
collector never had children. 
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term not only modern art but its mode of reception as well. Braddock’s 
“provisional institution” in this sense reveals its operative term. 
This detailed history of collecting and curating, combined with Braddock’s 
use of the term “author-practice”54 alongside the notion of the provisional 
institution is helpful in understanding the inevitable—but historically 
overlooked—practice of curating authorial identity in the process of exhibiting 
aesthetic ideals. Indeed, this historiography serves as a valuable perspective with 
which to observe processes of institutionalization into both postmodern critiques 
and the contemporary period55 by allowing for a view into the ideological systems 
surrounding the institutionalization of modern art in America, on which later 
standards are built. Perhaps most valuable for the study of the retrospective model 
is the foregrounding of the origins of the modern art institution as a function of 
two simultaneous modes of authorship: that of the artist as primary author, 
innovator, and agent of modernism, and that of the collector and corresponding 
institution as a kind of secondary, but mystified author of that authorship. 
Braddock’s characterization of the “provisional institution,” in combination with 
Bennett’s observation of the (historically preceding) epistemological shift from 
taxonomy to evolution in curating provides the climate within which the 
retrospective exhibitionary mode exemplifies fully both the fact that the art 
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55. “Postmodern” here describes art practice critical of the narratives put forth by 
modernity; the “contemporary” describes the current art historical moment. This is not to 
ignore that postmodern practice continues to feature in contemporary art, and that it does 
itself have a history. 
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museum had become “historicized through and through” in modernity and that 
such historicization was manifest in a new reverence for the inseparable 
relationship between an artist’s life and his or her work. The retrospective requires 
both these designations as model and modernist; in fact, the two qualifiers are 
mutually dependent, since the exhibition category actually models modernism. 
That the retrospective—as one of the only “named” exhibitionary models—
reflects with such clarity the ideological underpinnings of the modern art 
institution and supports the greater project of modernity itself, suggests how 
persuasive and enduring these modernisms are well into the contemporary period, 













4| Dennis Reid’s “Exploring Plane and Contour: The Drawing, Painting, Collage, 
Foldage, Photo-Work, Sculpture, and Film of Michael Snow from 1951 to 1967” 
 An interpretive method that is present in each of the AGO curator’s 
essays, but perhaps strongest in Reid’s, is the effort to articulate Snow’s 
undoubtedly varied oeuvre as consistent, and as innovative and experimental 
without ever venturing too far into the unpredictable or random. Indeed, Reid’s 
curatorial thesis is in many ways an argument not only for Snow’s consistency 
across a particular section of time, but a consistency measured by and against his 
well-known and numerous Walking Woman works.56 This analysis presents 
Snow’s work as satisfyingly balanced, a characteristic—and criterion—for 
monographic display traceable to the inception of the modernist institution (as 
explained by Jeremy Braddock in the preceding chapter). In his investigation of 
the collecting logic of Duncan Phillips, Braddock points out that implicit in the 
collector’s efforts to exhibit the modernist artist as a deeply critical individual 
who also “respected the continuity of aesthetic tradition” was: “…a preference for 
artists among whose work a continuity could be displayed. That continuity for 
Phillips always bespoke a principle of the artist’s personality, which, in turn, 
could be opposed to the group mentality he believed characterized radical 
work.”57 Based on this (rather conservative) criterion, Phillips exhibited a certain 
opposition to Pablo Picasso, because the “famous mutability of [the artist’s] 
                                                
56. The approach is also consistent with Reid’s preferred art historical method 
generally. The curator writes from within a particularly modernist art historical tradition, 
and is a contemporary of Snow. 
57. Braddock, Collecting as Modernist Practice, 91-2. 
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corpus” was for the collector too difficult to organize into a “coherent exhibition 
unit.”58 This strategy corresponds with what Braddock later terms the 
“institutional production of authorship,”59 and certainly recalls Foucault’s reading 
of the modern criteria for literary authorship as well, which demands that the 
author be “defined as a constant level of value…a field of conceptual or 
theoretical coherence…a stylistic unity…(and) a historical figure at the crossroads 
of a certain number of events.”60 These definitions are operative in Reid’s account 
of Snow in the curatorial essay “Exploring Plane and Contour.” Whereas there is 
certainly a distinction between Phillips’s role as a collector and Reid’s as a 
curator, each requires of their artists a set of criteria as creative but consistent. 
Such treatment of the artistic author also begins to make claims to Snow’s 
characteristics as an artist rather than about characteristics of painting or 
sculpture; accident, chance, and surprise are here incompatible (if observable) not 
just with Reid’s curatorial vision but the creation of the canonized artist generally. 
This summation of Snow also forms a hierarchy of critical reception in which 
negative reviews are written over in favour of the “enlightened” perspective of the 
historical present—a perspective that also functions to unify and regulate both 
Snow’s oeuvre and future interpretations of it. 
 Reid’s essay travels back in time, beginning in 1967, and proceeds 
chronologically backward to 1951, the year that marks for many the beginnings of 
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60. Foucault, “What Is an Author?” in Textual Strategies, 151. Foucault 
interprets these qualities from St. Jerome’s four criteria on authenticity. 
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Snow’s career. The curator’s stated objective is to “present a balanced view of 
Michael Snow’s career” and to “demonstrate that the most impressive features of 
his art were essentially in place at the beginning.”61 Reid’s history of Snow 
increasingly forms arguments for stylistic cohesion across this timeframe, 
traceable to discernable origins, and often beyond observable characteristics, 
opting to consider Snow’s sensibilities alongside other archival documentation as 
integral to this “balanced view.”  In taking care to trace the chronology of the 
Walking Woman, the curator is also accounting for and re-articulating stylistic 
diversions as rather part of a logical, steady style on the part of Snow 
conceptually. One way of completing this recovery is by aligning the artist with 
his canonized contemporaries as a way of proving that the cultural milieu in 
which one works constitutes a kind of incubator for creative concepts, even if 
these concepts are manifest in what appears to be a sudden or surprising way. 
Writing in relation to a work titled Lac Clair (1960), Reid argues that although 
Snow’s new stylistic direction in this particular painting might appear tangential 
to his other more expressive aesthetic preoccupations of the time, the artist was 
participating in a shared aesthetic experimentation among his New York 
contemporaries. The work was negatively received by critics when first exhibited 
because of its “affront” on the purely gestural formal qualities popularized by 
Abstract Expressionism; Snow’s monochromatic, shimmering blue, painterly 
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strokes are instead for Reid “fundamentally ordered,” “deliberate,” and subvert 
“all sense of spontaneous expressiveness.”62 But this reading is in tension with 
seemingly contradictory statements about the work’s magical qualities: Reid 
describes Lac Clair in the same analysis as evoking “the aura of a benign force 
conjured up” by the paint strokes which build “almost to the level of a force of 
nature as it softly swells against the visual torque generated by the four strips of 
brown paper” on either side of the canvas; later the painting is described as an 
“eccentric framing of sensitive brushwork.” Reid maintains a vocabulary for 
expressiveness typical of analyses of the very movement from which he maintains 
Lac Clair departs. Whereas “spontaneity” may not describe the work, eccentricity, 
sensitivity, and control refer romantically to Lac Clair’s aura, and thus re-
associate the painting with the “near-canonical formal values” Reid maintains are 
characteristic of Abstract Expressionism and “foundational of modernist art,” but 
which Snow is said to subvert. Later, Reid makes the case for Snow’s 
participation in and admiration of the styles of his contemporaries, but is also 
careful to note the artist’s diversions. Works like Lac Clair did not 
“spontaneously spring into being” but rather “developed from a long process…in 
which admiration for aspects of Abstract Expressionism” was an important factor; 
“Snow knew,” Reid writes “as did all the brightest artists of his generation, that it 
was impossible to emulate what they admired…They had to find new ways to 
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achieve those heights again.”63 The curator thus formalizes this balance between 
respect for art historical tradition within an argument for unique innovation, 
recalling the criteria for canonization that described the ideal modernist painters in 
Braddock’s analysis of the Phillips collection. 
Reid also acknowledges Snow’s own explicit dissociation from the styles 
and techniques of his New York contemporary Robert Rauschenberg as a source 
of influence,64 but Snow’s own confirmed distaste is pushed aside in favour of 
what is for Reid a clear—if unconscious for the artist—preoccupation with the 
“post-action painting” movement Snow would have likely encountered during his 
time spent in New York. And while this interpretation attends to the equally 
problematic, formalist impulse to view works as aesthetically autonomous (with 
their creation isolated from their cultural and historical conditions) it does so 
because the work might appear inconsistent with the artist’s other projects; it also 
functions to “smooth over” historical discontinuity that might otherwise fail to 
support a coherent impression of Snow’s work over time. In the same discussion, 
Reid subverts Snow’s dissociation from Rauschenberg as a source of influence 
again when he overwrites this sentiment in favour of a narrative in which the 
artist’s collaged “foldages”65 are not only a product of the artist’s time in New 
York but a witnessing and unconscious integration of Rauschenberg’s work into 
his practice. Reid asks whether Snow’s Tramp’s Bed (1955) could have even 
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“come to mind without the example of Robert Rauschenberg’s famous combine 
painting Bed, also of 1955…Perhaps.”66 Another occasion quotes Snow as 
similarly distancing himself from the aesthetic concerns of Henri Matisse in his 
collage works; despite being “interested in Matisse,” Snow states that there is not 
“any evidence of that [style] in these works,” but instead prefers to align his early 
1955 collages more closely with the work of Willem de Kooning and Arshile 
Gorky.67 Reid finds the dissociation “surprising” because some of Snow’s other 
collages from slightly later in the decade clearly “reveal a thoughtful familiarity 
with the French master,” while the “highly resolved works of art” by the young 
Snow are “to all appearances independent of their inspiration in the work of de 
Kooning and Gorky.”68 This type of interpretive argument departs from another 
logic Reid employs elsewhere (discussed below) in which the artist’s statement 
functions as the authority on questions of interpretation. It would seem that where 
these statements do not logically frame the artist and his works according to the 
modern criteria for canonization, the curatorial voice reorients interpretation of 
certain works toward more legible statements about influence. This is an example 
of how it might be too simple to argue that the retrospective model insists 
categorically on artistic authorship, but rather oscillates between authorial 
statements and curatorial “override,” depending on which supports a particular, 
desired characterization. Again—and as stated earlier in reference to the state of 
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scholarship on author theory—the interpretive logic is not a comment on whether 
biography is a feature in art analysis, but how the author and biographical 
information are manipulated to a particular rhetorical end. 
 Reid is at once validating Snow’s production by recalling his associations 
(in both exhibitions and critical texts) with other canonized artists and 
movements, and differentiating Snow from these contemporaries by suggesting 
that his work goes far beyond mere imitation of the artistically fashionable. Such 
interpretation suggests that earlier, negative criticisms rest on what Reid perceives 
to be shallow readings of Snow’s work, which fail to recognize neither the artist’s 
alignment with concurrent art movements, nor his uniqueness among them. Reid 
also explores the degrees of consciousness with which Snow worked within these 
popular themes and methods, especially the concerns of Pop Art. Whereas much 
of Snow’s early painting and sculpture recalls the simple style of commercial 
images, and indeed prompts these readings for many viewers, Reid argues for a 
certain independence of Snow’s work in relation to mass media. Reid relies on 
Snow’s statements about his own work as the standard by which the validity of 
certain other receptions are measured, to show that the artist “does not 
consciously work from [Pop Art] in the manner that in the Sixties was one of the 
defining characteristics of [the movement].”69 This suggestion by Snow 
overwrites the sentiments of the exhibition visitors and reviewers of a March 1966 
show at the Isaacs Gallery, so as to formulate an argument for Snow’s 
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sophistication beyond what are perceive to be the more superficial concerns of 
Pop Art. The work Corner Piece (1963), a Walking Woman who now takes the 
form of a “knick-knack” shelf mounted in a corner, for example, “might have 
seemed Pop” to some critics but “clearly has more to do with Snow’s desire to 
keep ‘finding out what happens when you do such and such a thing’ than with in 
some way entailing popular culture.”70 A Pop reading is demoted as historically 
naïve and merely a popular critical response, where Snow’s self-description is 
framed as the preferred, enduring lens through which to read his Walking Women 
works.71 So while Reid sees a certain distance from the concerns of Pop by way of 
Snow’s refusal to use existing popular images (and given Snow’s own admission 
that his work’s resemblance to Pop is “an unexplainable coincidence,”72 one may 
just as easily make the argument that he and (fellow artist and first wife) Joyce 
Wieland’s own campaigns to popularize the Walking Woman iconography echoes 
strongly Pop’s preoccupation with widespread iconographic reproduction and 
dissemination beyond the gallery. The difference in Reid’s interpretation is in 
service of the justification of retrospective viewing; articulating Snow’s work as 
more sophisticated than Pop Art is instrumental to understanding it—for the 
purposes of The Michael Snow Project’s characterization of the oeuvre—as 
aligned with popular concerns, but exemplary in its execution. That Snow’s 
painting straddles the line between Pop and Abstract Expressionism—exhibiting 
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“the finer instincts of a formalist, coupled with the well-digested lessons of action 
painting”73 is even more advantageous in this regard, in that it simultaneously 
characterizes Snow as an artistic author with a modernist’s formal control and as a 
painter who views his art as a form of self-expression, and who is regularly read, 
to return to Green’s monographic critique, as “rendering a personality in paint.”74 
 Complementary to this interpretation is Reid’s regular reference to 
preparatory drawings from Snow’s archives as evidence of the artist’s 
deliberateness as characteristic of his process. This tendency reflects Green’s 
concern about the impulse in monographic readings to consider sketches and 
studies, since “everything, from the least significant sketch and preparatory 
drawing through to unfinished or abandoned compositions, everything is 
redefined as integral to the corpus.” This “transformation of the whole conception 
of an artist’s oeuvre” is the way that genius might be “spied out” insofar as it 
reveals itself in those visual texts that are thought of as sharing a more intimate 
relation with the artist’s private disposition.75 Here the modernist criteria for 
genius are found in not just the artwork but also the wealth of documentation that 
surrounds it. Certainly, Reid relies on this tendency to continue his argument for 
Snow’s consistent character. “That Snow manipulated apparently accidental 
characteristics of the painting process,” Reid writes, in reference to the painting 
Secret Shout (1960) “is confirmed by an inscription in the upper-right hand corner 
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of the [work’s preparatory] drawing: ‘paint the yellow to flow in shape 
direction.’”76 Again an observable formal shift yields to authorial confirmation, 
especially where this confirmation—as located outside of the work itself in 
preparatory drawings and notes—functions to recover Snow’s work from 
participation in randomness or chance, both characteristics unsupportive of Reid’s 
formulation of the artist as controlled, purposeful, and consistent. In another 
example, the curator argues for the artist’s conceptual control in what appears to 
be the “an urgent drawing and at times crude”77 canvas for January Jubilee Ladies 
(c. 1961). Reid writes that the work’s preparatory drawings “demonstrate Snow’s 
characteristically careful planning of the seemingly spontaneous composition;” 
what cannot be formally evidenced in the “urgent” painting itself is differed to 
rough work in support of an argument for the character of Snow’s process (and of 
the artist himself). This fine balance between expressive impulsivity and 
measured control becomes for Reid an important characterization that elevates 
Snow above his contemporaries and their more categorical art movements while 
also supporting Reid’s overall thesis for stylistic consistency “from the 
beginning.” 
 These tendencies lead Reid to a number of speculative comments about 
the history of Snow and his work. In an interpretive jump more typical of 
biographically driven readings, Reid refers to a 1957 William Ronald show in 
New York, which exhibited some shared concerns with gestural painting. 
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Although Reid cannot confirm that Snow attended this show, the evidence of an 
invitation in his personal archives suggests enough of a connection to form a 
hypothesis that the event “may have precipitated”78 a response in Snow’s 
seemingly sudden response to gesture in his painting Move (1957). This 
conjectural linkage is extended further when Reid suggests that “If [Snow and 
Wieland] made it to Ronald’s opening in mid-April 1957, they doubtless visited 
Artists of the New York School: Second Generation at the Jewish Museum (10 
March-28 April), a much-discussed exhibition that included the work of Alfred 
Leslie, just one example among many of a painter wrestling with the challenge of 
de Kooning’s accomplishments in a way that Snow would have understood.”79 
But despite Reid’s efforts to form a tangible connection between Snow and other 
major exhibitions of Abstract Expressionism in New York, the curator also makes 
sure to give Snow his deserved artistic autonomy. However influenced by other 
movements, Move for Reid “grew directly from Snow’s experience…not from his 
response to the experiences of others.”80 Again the interpretive tendency forms a 
balanced impression of Snow by first associating him with established styles at 
the center of the art world, thus invoking a narrative of influence, and at the same 
time isolating the artist from these communities so as to characterize his art as not 
merely responsive but generating from a private, personal experience of the 
world. Another of Reid’s statements—offered toward the end of his essay—
                                                
78. Ibid., 103. 
79. Ibid..  
80. Ibid., 104. 
 45 
exemplifies well this attempt to balance harmoniously a sense of consistency with 
innovation, control with experiment and originality. But Reid is again careful to 
allow Snow some degree of creative variance. He quotes critic Robert Fulford, an 
avid follower of Snow’s career, who writes in response to a 1960 Isaacs 
exhibition that despite Snow’s increasingly observable consistency in his painting, 
“This is not to say that Snow strikes the same note over and over again…” but 
rather “stands as far as possible from the kind of stylized abstractionist…who 
procures painting after painting in the same mood and style.”81 The 
characterization of a balanced Snow is here even more nuanced; while the artist is 
regularly and emphatically celebrated for his consistency, his is simultaneously 
safe from any charge of dry predictability. Rather, his process to explore 
variations via repetition within a scheme is indicative of his desire to explore a 
range of expressions, styles, and moods. 
Reid cautions that Snow’s trajectory may not be what it seems: 
 
This appearance of a strictly linear evolution [in Snow’s oeuvre] is 
deceiving, however…Granted, as we have moved back through time we 
have found ample evidence of a sort of sequential development arising 
from experimentation, but it has been just as evident that Snow’s method 
is to work around a defined problem, exercising the issue…testing the 
limits, expanding his range of techniques.82 
 
There is an outward “appearance” (this time of “linear progression” rather than 
stylistic continuity) that is similarly threatening to a characterization of Snow as 
too consistent to the point of predictability. By later articulating Snow’s method 
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as a “centrifugal way of working,”83 Reid can distance Snow from predictability 
and discontinuity while also supporting his greater curatorial thesis which looks to 
identify “origins” of both the Walking Woman works and Snow’s style generally. 
In this sense, Reid’s analysis has Snow’s character—both biographical and 
aesthetic—perfectly primed for canonization by the former’s retrospective 
looking; this is a characterization supported by author-statements only where they 
serve to “close” interpretation toward arguments for consistency. In effect, the 
narrative of Snow’s career presents the artist as at once innovative and 
unchanging, protean but steady or, in Green’s word’s “both developing through 
life and embryonically preformed,”84 an author who contains in him the qualities 
of coherence and genius that strengthens his candidacy for retrospective 
treatment. 
 Reid follows this culminating case for consistency with a brief argument 
about the solo exhibition as the optimal mode of display for Snow’s work, 
suggesting that pieces presented in isolation risk being ridiculed or 
misunderstood.85 He describes how the artist’s first solo exhibition at the 
Greenwich Gallery86 in Toronto in 1956 “was precisely the sort of deliberately 
structured public statement of aesthetic position…as would become characteristic 
[and it] encompassed within its clearly defined parameters a wide range of 
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expression.”87 This statement brings together a number of aforementioned 
interpretive threads; not only does retrospective viewing require an understanding 
of Snow’s oeuvre as always connected and purposeful, but it also privileges the 
solo exhibition as the only model that can facilitate and encourage the true 
meanings of certain artworks. This proposal implies that “misunderstood” critical 
commentary is then—in part—a function of inferior display, where art works 
achieve full legibility only in reference to others by the same creator. It 
establishes once more the criteria for balance the between the protean and 
predictable forces as identified by Braddock (i.e. “clearly defined parameters” but 
“a wide range of expression”) and it implies that retrospective solo exhibitions 
(like the one Reid participates in here) present the best opportunity to see these 
“deliberately structured public statements of aesthetic position” – that is not 
simply Snow’s position, but the institution’s as well, as it relies on these types of 
authorial characterizations. Reid’s commentary therefore functions to classify 
Snow as retrospective-worthy according to a precise set of ideologically 
constructed criteria, but also classify the solo show as the preferred curatorial 
model for interpretive clarity, beyond just its functioning as an important signal of 
professional success. 
 Reid’s critical method—beginning with the end of his historical 
timeframe and working backward toward the conceptual seeds of Snow’s 
career—also functions generally as a focusing on origins. While the historical 
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parameters of his essay indicate that the backward narrative will end somewhere 
in 1951, Reid goes far beyond Snow’s first exhibitions whilst simultaneously 
questioning the validity of tracing back to the impossibly elusive indications of 
“nascent talent.”88 “How far back can we go, should we go?” asks Reid as he 
begins his concluding remarks; he recognizes that to seek out influence in the 
artist’s youth and family history is tempting, but also brings the analysis “into the 
realms of investigation and conjecture outside the usual province of art history.” 
This realization is in keeping with The Michael Snow Project’s awareness of the 
retrospective as a model imposing interpretive constraints, but what follows in 
Reid’s essays exemplifies the persistence with which these constraints come to 
bear on curatorial argument. The last sentence of “Plane and Contour” reads: 
For now, all we can do is symbolically chart the field by recording that 
Michael Snow was born in Toronto 10 December 1929 to Marie-
Antoinette Snow, nee Levesque, of Chicoutimi, Quebec, and Gerald 
Bradley Snow of Toronto, civil engineer, and that he has said “I think the 
two most important things in my life were that my father went blind when 
I was 15, and that my mother loved music.”89 
 
This inclusion is telling because it formalizes the tension between Reid’s 
awareness of the biographical tendency and the necessity of working within it. 
While the curator does not explicitly interpret the relations between Snow’s 
biographical details and his work, the implication of their thematic connections is 
present. The use of Snow’s statement about his parents provides source events for 
his career trajectory, and his date of birth functions as the source event for the 
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birth of both person and artist; in other words, identity and artistic authority are 
collapsed, making the life the temporal bracketing of the work. Contradiction and 
incoherence resolve at the level of the author. Reid’s overall curatorial argument 
toward the artist’s consistency-as-character is then also one of biographical logic, 
where even childhood experiences are used as evidence for originality, and artistic 
innovation stems from implications of “nascent talent” despite the curator’s 
wariness of such speculation.90 Reid’s Snow is consistent, characterized, and fully 
formed as “origin,” and is as such in keeping with modernist criteria for artistic 
individuality. The retrospective, even more, is the way that we might discern these 
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5| Philip Monk’s “Around Wavelength: The Sculpture, Film, and Photo-Work of 
Michael Snow from 1967 to 1969” 
Philip Monk’s five-part essay “Around Wavelength: The Sculpture, Film, 
and Photo-Work of Michael Snow from 1967 to 1969” is much more theoretically 
driven than Reid’s historical overview. The essay presents a curatorial argument 
by way of photographic metaphor, in which Monk frames his exhibition Around 
Wavelength as “an aperture to separate select works from the wide concerns 
featured in the comprehensive exhibitions that bracket it, while acting at the same 
time as a hinge between them.”91 The aperture metaphor similarly “mirrors” for 
Monk the nature of the work produced by Snow within the time period examined. 
Each of these works “…concentrated their apparatus on the function of viewing in 
order to make sight visible…They effectively put an end to the image of the 
Walking Woman, filtering perceptual and conceptual themes to their more purified 
essence, before Snow’s themes broadened out again to wider image practices 
during the 1970s.” 92 Monk’s metaphor is strategic and instrumental to the 
historicizing of Snow’s career as one of aesthetic progress in that it both accounts 
for certain aesthetic “ends” (here, that of the Walking Woman series) as not abrupt 
stylistic shifts but explainable and deeply considered intellectual processes 
locatable in the sentiments of the artist even when not plainly visible or formally 
evident in works themselves. Like Reid, Monk’s theoretical argument—this time 
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very explicitly aware of how the occasion of the retrospective invites a particular 
investigative mode93—still relies regularly on artistic authority as the final word 
in matters of interpretation. His analysis also activates a tension between a 
recognition and celebration of the intertextual and author-critical implications of 
much of Snow’s work from this period and a tendency to return to matters of 
artistic “desire” and intent as original sources of meaning.  
 Monk cleverly introduces his essay with a brief discussion of Snow’s 1970 
work Side Seat Paintings Slides Sound Film, a work produced on the occasion of 
an earlier, major retrospective of the artist’s work at the AGO in partnership with 
the Isaacs Gallery titled Michael Snow / A Survey.94 The film shows a traditional 
art historical slide lecture—the topic of which is Snow’s painting from 1954-
1965—but the viewing perspective is off-set; that is, the line of sight is from the 
side, and the viewer witnesses the lecture “as if arriving late…so is afforded only 
an oblique view.”95 The example is important for Monk because it aligns The 
Michael Snow Project’s (and Around Wavelength’s) retrospective view with 
Snow’s own historical self-analysis in the form of Side Seat. Here Monk 
compares the project to Snow’s creative “looking back,” but notes some 
differences, and in doing so indirectly begins to define the nature of the AGO’s 
institutional retrospective; the gesture of looking back is this time “at a greater 
distance,” but it is also a look “through each [work’s] shared structures and 
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mutual influence.” So while for Snow we know that Side Seat (itself prompted by 
the occasion of the AGO’s 1970 Snow retrospective) is about the 
“transformation” of media and the simultaneous experience for the spectator of 
past and present, the retrospective view is instead for Monk a mode of viewing 
which is driven by how works viewed historically share in aesthetic qualities and 
concerns; in other words, how these works influence and dialogue with each 
other. So whereas Snow’s Side Seat is in many ways a project critical of the 
distorted nature of historical looking, Monk’s characterization of his own look 
back follows a logic of aesthetic containment, progress, and canonization.96 That 
Monk compares The Michael Snow Project with the artist’s gesture in Side Seat is 
telling in itself; the curator mirrors the reflective nature of the work—one that 
responds in many ways to retrospective treatment—by offering this treatment 
once again. This in effect returns Side Seat to Snow’s corpus, despite its initial 
function as a response to his own institutional characterization. This process of 
absorbing works into an existing, historical construction of artistic authorship 
created by the institution describes both Monk’s method and the effect of the 
retrospective format generally. 
What follows in the essay is a theoretical argument around Monk’s 
proposition that Snow’s best-known film work Wavelength is in many ways the 
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artist’s “last Walking Woman work.”97 This is because it distills certain formal 
preoccupations such as the relations between theme and variation, and focuses 
what Monk purports to be Snow’s desire to render visible the complex and 
layered process of perception. The chapter “Around Wavelength” (and Around 
Wavelength, the exhibition) then describes those works that operate conceptually 
(and are made within the timeline Monk investigates) around the film as a pivot. 
By creating a conceptual center or origin—however atemporal—for Snow’s 
aesthetic investigations, Monk’s essay reinforces an already-established 
canonization of Wavelength as Snow’s definitive work of originality and genius; 
even more, it forms an argument around Wavelength as not merely a product of 
aesthetic concerns but an isolation of authorial desire, thereby invoking the 
modernist authorial preoccupation with accessing an artist’s mentality. The 
curatorial argument also serves to fuse the Walking Woman series (well-known 
with Snow’s Toronto following), Snow’s later sculptural work, and Wavelength 
(better known internationally), as necessary parts of the same aesthetic project, 
with Wavelength as a kind of culmination or perfection of a particular aesthetic 
problem. In this sense what many perceive to be a defining characteristic of many 
of Snow’s projects—the working out of variations within clearly defined limits—
serves for Monk as the model by which we are to understand not just the relations 
between works in a given project, but relations between separate works in the 
artist’s oeuvre. This containment of the corpus engages a formalist analysis that 
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strengthens the legitimacy of Snow’s work and further maintains the canonization 
of Wavelength as aesthetic “summation.”98  
Monk’s essay contains a close theoretical analysis of Wavelength, 
characterizing it as an “aperture” for Snow’s career in that it focuses and 
literalizes some of his aesthetic concerns, articulated by Monk as the artist’s 
“desire.” But while Monk is certainly and powerfully aware of the nature of 
retrospective analysis and the complexities of self-referentiality, his 
interpretation—similar to Reid’s—relies on authorial voice as confirmation of 
curatorial argument. Monk introduces Wavelength with a popular quotation from 
Snow who explains that he “wanted to make a summation of [his] nervous 
system, religious inklings, and aesthetic ideas.”99 Monk relies on this articulation 
of artistic desire as foundational to his argument. Indeed, the curator repeats this 
statement three times in his essay, regularly returning his reading of the film to its 
authorial inception and privileging this statement as a definitive source of 
meaning. This notion of Wavelength as not just a “summation” of aesthetic 
concerns but a product of authorial desires, mental states, or here “religious 
inklings” corresponds well with Monk’s sub-chapter, suitably titled “See It My 
Way.”100 Monk explains that the title is taken from a reference made in Snow’s 
notes and that it is reflective of the artist’s “modernist” interest in “changing 
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vision or directing it to new sources.”101 But this statement is also for Monk an 
indication of Snow’s “possession” of the spectator’s sight in the form of both the 
artist’s perceptual sculptures and Wavelength; Snow imposes a “psychological 
element of constraint”102 along with a physical directing of vision (works like 
Scope (1967), for example) which for Monk reinforces his curatorial references to 
authorial control as determining (in this case, quite literally) the meaning of the 
particular works that manipulate vision. And while these sculptural works 
(including Wavelength, with its determined zoom) from this period are indeed 
manipulating the sight lines of the spectator, embodied vision is here relegated to 
the momentary embodiment of the artist’s perspective rather than a more viewer-
conscious experience of visualized vision.  
 This characterization of artistic authorship—as “possessing” momentarily 
one’s vision—is in tension with a second argumentative thread that runs through 
Monk’s essay: namely, that which recognizes the intertextual possibilities implied 
by Snow’s sculpture from this period and the artist’s own suggested criticisms of 
the modernist preoccupation with resolved, interior mental states. Many of 
Monk’s art historical references (including extensive quotation from Paul de Man 
and Annette Michelson) begin to characterize both Wavelength and the sculpture 
Monk discusses as activating a dialogue between sign systems internal to and 
generating from within the space of the film. An example of this tension is in 
Monk’s deployment of a particular analysis of Wavelength via the discussion of 
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allegory (as opposed to symbol) proposed by deconstructionist literary critic Paul 
de Man in his own discussion of figurative language in Romantic literature. This 
reading—deconstructionist to be sure and therefore certainly divergent from more 
plainly biographical readings characteristic of the retrospective model—is 
important in its engagement of de Man, particularly in the kind of deconstruction 
it espouses. De Man’s Rhetoric of Temporality proposes an important function of 
allegory as a literary and artistic figurative device, despite its historic demotion 
(by some Romantic poets in particular) as less effective in comparison to the 
symbol, which was an “intimate unity between the image that arises up before the 
senses and the suprasensory totality that the image suggests.”103 This unity is what 
authenticates the symbol as a figurative operation, whereas the allegory—in its 
distance and separation from its referent—was thought to have made it the weaker 
literary and artistic device. What de Man proposes is that it is precisely this 
distance that grants allegory its own authenticity, which is also more aptly 
descriptive of a Romantic epistemological turn toward intersubjective modes of 
dealing with ontological questions. Whereas the association of the symbol with 
Romantic literature reflected the movement’s intimate “relationship between mind 
and nature, between subject and object,”104 it could not ultimately account for 
how imagery was to also describe the subject’s temporal and therefore 
contradictory relation to the object (in this case, universal and timeless nature) 
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with which it seeks to find sympathy or “affinity.”105 Allegory offers a symbolic 
language that attends to this tension. For de Man, it “corresponds to the unveiling 
of an authentically temporal destiny…this unveiling takes place in a subject that 
has sought refuge against the impact of time in a natural world to which, in truth, 
it bears no resemblance.”106 The allegory’s distance from its origins spatializes 
time, thus insisting on a sign system in which it refers to “another sign that 
precedes it” rather than an original referent. The allegory therefore succeeds for 
de Man as a device that corresponds with the painful realization in Romanticism 
of the self’s “illusory identification with the non-self.”107 Monk takes up this final 
idea of the sign system and selfhood as a lens through which to read Wavelength’s 
zoom in combination with the successive and repetitive filmic frames. The film’s 
durational aspect presents that allegorical “illusion of continuity that [the viewing 
subject] knows to be illusionary,”108 but returns the conversation about this 
anxious selfhood back to Snow himself rather than to Wavelength’s spectator. 
In drawing on de Man’s theory, Monk proposes not so much an inter- but 
intra-textual reading of Wavelength, where the result is “a play of differences 
within the text that results in its positions being always already textual;” that is, 
the “announcements and echoes”109 that describe the sequence of images in 
Snow’s film are aligned with de Man’s notion of allegory because its structure 
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“necessarily contains a constitutive temporal element;” it is “the allegorical mode 
only” that for Monk can describe the multiple and conflicting registers of 
Wavelength and “the summations that must be resolved as much as they express 
on the part of the artist conflicting nostalgia and desires.”110 Here, Monk’s reading 
accomplishes a number of sub-theses that support both an experimental critique of 
the art work as a “text” while also continuing to support authorial canonization; 
for later literary critics like Tilottama Rajan, this brand of “intra-textuality” 
championed by de Man comes under criticism insofar as this refusal to 
“deautonomize” the text reinforces “the canonical status of the individual 
work.”111 So while Monk’s reading certainly describes how Wavelength presents a 
kind of non-narrative, allegorical dialogue, his choice of investigative mode also 
brackets the work, contributing to a general characterization of its purity and 
distillation of Snow’s aesthetic desires, rather than to an epistemological moment 
of subjectivity which preoccupies de Man’s thesis. The intratextual reading does 
not then explicitly rely on biographical details in the same way that Reid’s essay 
does, but rather considers the already celebrated Wavelength as the example of 
Snow’s methodological perfect and aesthetic purification by aligning it with de 
Man’s allegory. 
Monk takes his analytic direction from another statement of Snow’s in 
reference to the 1970 work Authorization; the artist states that the photographic 
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sculpture represents an effort to “use photography in a very enclosed way so that 
there is nothing outside the work itself that is used in the photograph…as in 
certain kinds of painting which have an autonomy of their own.”112 Authorization 
for Monk is then “a record of its own making, as if in dialogue with itself through 
the process of its self-fabrication;”113 it is similarly “tautological,” incorporating 
the artist’s image not as a product of “solipsism”114 but as a necessary inclusion of 
process in a completed, contained picture. But this tautology serves as an efficient 
formalist lens through which to view Snow’s portraiture for the purposes of 
retrospective analysis. Canadian curator Tila Kellman criticizes this tendency to 
read Snow’s work like this as “so self-enclosed that conditions of production are 
the same as those of presentation” because they imply the existence of an artistic 
author as generative source or authority (of course Snow’s title names this theme 
explicitly) and tend to close potential discussions of viewership.115 But Kellman is 
more so concerned with Authorization as it asks “Who?” (as opposed to “How?” 
or “What if?”)—that is, it asks about the degree to which Snow’s serial acts of 
self-representation to the point of obscuration comment on the tradition of 
portraiture, authorship, and viewership. That the work includes the mirror allows 
the viewer to witness both the literal position of Snow in process—the 
replacement of the viewer’s head by images of the artist—and the disintegration 
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 60 
of Snow’s face as snapshots similarly accumulate over his own image. But while 
the argument for tautology refers back to Snow as the works “source,” Kellman 
reads the work as a greater acknowledgement of the “promise”116 between artist 
and spectator as necessary to the witnessing of the portrait. By insisting on and 
incorporating the image of the viewer, Authorization “seems to acknowledge how 
it cannot exist without my [i.e. Kellman’s, or the viewer’s] co-authorization, 
mirrored and thought.”117 The image is therefore not simply a product of a 
generative principle for image-making, but a dialogue of desire between the artist 
as he announces the “repeated attestation: “I promise you that I am here, as artist, 
in the field of representation,””118 and the viewer as she validates this 
announcement because it insists “on the circulation of [her] sight through 
materialized visual discourse.”119 Here Monk’s reading of Authorization (and 
works like it in the chapter “Around Wavelength”) engage a more strictly 
formalist method in the service of maintaining Snow as retrospective-worthy—as 
the origin of process (and implicitly, genius) from which a strictly controlled and 
autonomous work is born, when other readings (perhaps slightly less in favour of 
this traditional notion of authorship although certainly still respectful of the 
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artist’s insight) open interpretation to include a necessarily present viewing 
subject.120 
This intra-textual reading is also in many ways that which characterizes 
the overarching argument about mutual influence that Monk begins his essay 
with. Works from this period constitute a kind of sign system to which both 
Snow’s Walking Woman series and Wavelength refer. The artist refines aesthetic 
problems, which culminate in Wavelength as a summation of Snow’s 
preoccupations; the film work also acts as a refraction of aesthetic concern that 
logically introduces that which proceeds from it thematically into the 1980s and 
1990s. Monk’s aperture metaphor is then instrumental in the retrospective 
argument as it mechanizes Snow’s corpus and the exhibition Around Wavelength, 
especially placed alongside the arguments put forth by de Man. Just as Monk 
proposes that works like Wavelength and Authorization generate their own 
internal logic systems, so does he make a case for Snow’s oeuvre to do just the 
same. Monk presents this particular period of production—with the intra-textual 
reading of Wavelength as a unit of measure—as a contained system of aesthetic 
language, at once in dialogue within individual works and between them as 
canonized objects. What questioning there is of the complex “subject” is, in 
addition, returned to a consideration of authorial feelings and desires rather than 
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to those of the spectator, thus directing analysis to Snow as a conflicted—indeed, 
Romantic—author, whose own selfhood plays out in his art. Just as there is no 
“outside” to the tautological Wavelength or Authorization, there is for Monk’s 



















6| Louise Dompierre’s “Embodied Vision: The Painting, Sculpture, Photo-Work, 
Sound Installation, Music, Holographic Work, Films and Books of Michael Snow 
from 1970 to 1992” 
Like Monk’s, Louise Dompierre’s catalogue essay “Embodied Vision: The 
Painting, Sculpture, Photo-Work, Sound Installation, Music, Holographic Work, 
Films and Books of Michael Snow from 1970-1992” communicates an awareness 
of the complex nature of retrospective viewing. The curator for the Power Plant 
iteration of The Michael Snow Project begins the essay with a kind of anecdotal 
metaphor, as she walks through the exhibition space as one would walk through a 
natural environment. There is in equal parts a temptation on this walk, Dompierre 
explains, both to follow the path as laid out by history and to divert from it, 
exploring the “delight of trying to look at things from a slightly different 
perspective.”121 But even in this explorative re-visitation, there are blind spots; 
Dompierre admits that even in an attempt to “see as much as possible…there will 
be many things that will escape” her observation.122 This creative introduction to 
the essay demonstrates an awareness of the necessary interpretive strengths and 
weaknesses of historical analysis—namely, that looking back is curatorial in the 
sense that the process involves selection, omission, and the task of offering a 
sense of thematic and formal cohesion. But what may appear to be critical 
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diversions from a given historical path in Dompierre’s essay are only temporary, 
since the interpretive limits imposed by the retrospective framework insist that 
these diversions all lead back to a well-trodden path toward authorial 
canonization. This redirection is primarily observable in a tension between more 
postmodern theoretical concerns in Snow’s later work and the tendency for these 
concerns to become overshadowed by the justification of celebrity required by the 
retrospective model. 
A kind of secondary introduction to the essay begins with a discussion of 
Snow’s 1970 work Venetian Blind, a photographic series of 24 snapshots, 
arranged in a grid, which show blurred close-ups of the artist’s face and feature 
“the shimmering water surrounding Venice”123 in the background. Despite the 
work’s literal obscuring of the artist’s image, Dompierre writes that “more 
importantly…Venetian Blind, allows a glimpse into the artist’s inner state…it 
tends to allow speculation as to the artist’s emotional state” and “captures the 
feeling of euphoria, perhaps, that Snow might have experience at this particular 
time in his life.”124 That Dompierre begins with this analysis which suggests that 
the artwork offers a degree of insight into an artist’s emotional states is perhaps 
symptomatic of the retrospective constraints, where even a work critical of 
authorship and the retrospective occasion is re-framed as novel for its entry into 
an artist’s private life. This oscillation between the explicit recognition and 
understanding of a complex and plural self that is the author and this redirection 
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toward canonical reinforcements characterizes Dompierre’s essay. The logic is 
reflected in the curator’s titular argument surrounding the notion of “embodied 
vision” and the opposing force of biographical concerns. While we might assume 
from the nature of Snow’s work that the “embodiment” activated here is that of 
the spectator, close analysis of Dompierre’s interpretive logic destabilizes this 
assumption, when it may just as easily be said that the embodied vision she speaks 
of is that of Snow’s. This opening reading of Venetian Blind alludes to 
Dompierre’s analyses that follow, where the recognition of Snow’s aesthetic 
diversions as well as the complexity of artists’ histories is in tension with an 
interpretive tendency to return to the artist’s subjectivity as something resolved 
and unified.  
Like Monk, Dompierre is very aware and equally critical of the effects of 
the retrospective, but confines these criticisms mostly to a discussion of the 
AGO’s 1970 retrospective exhibition (and Snow’s response in the form of his 
artist’s book/catalogue Michael Snow: A Survey, which borrows the exhibition 
title) which prompted a reflective, creative response from the artist. For one, 
Dompierre recognizes a reputation of the retrospective model, that it is often 
perceived to function as a kind of closure for an artist’s career, but that it is: 
…hard to see how [this view] applies to the career of Michael Snow. 
Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest that his 1970 exhibition…was 
detrimental to him in any way, neither curbing his creativity nor 
diminishing his opportunities to exhibit. The reverse, in fact, might be said 
to be true. Presented with a unique opportunity to reflect upon his broad 
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accomplishments to date, Snow seemed to have been propelled into the 
most productive years of his career (...)125 
 
But the retrospective also functions, as Dompierre later implies, as a particular 
reading of an artist’s body of work alongside a life, and is not merely a way of 
marking off stylistic beginnings and ends. A Survey (the artist’s book) might be 
for Snow an alternative retrospective model where fiction, disorganization, and 
chaotic elements are a response to the occasion of the 1970 retrospective, which 
Dompierre suggests presented Snow “in a certain way.”126 The book is an album 
of text and photographs; it experimentally juxtaposes snapshots from Snow’s life 
and images of artworks, and is intercut with reviews and lists in various typefaces. 
Sometimes these texts are printed backward or on top of existing print, making 
legibility difficult or even impossible. 
“A Plural Self” – the sub-title of one of Dompierre’s essay sections, 
acknowledges explicitly that Snow’s critical questioning of authorship and 
narrative by way of fictionalization and fragment is the “altered…space where 
most of Snow’s work functioned during much of the Seventies and Eighties.”127 
But also for Dompierre, Michael Snow: A Survey is essential in its insistence on 
the inextricability of one’s art from life;128 it emphasizes the importance of the 
role of “personal history and subjectivity” in art making, but also sustains a 
degree of fiction in its experimental presentation. The artist book, which takes up 
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similar concerns in Snow’s work from the period in question, begins to function 
for Dompierre as still a metaphorical window into the artist’s disposition; rather 
than deconstruct the author as a fluid—indeed constructed and highly mythicized 
relative of oeuvre—A Survey for the curator “manages to reflect a playful, 
seemingly candid, yet private Snow.”129 This attempt to characterize the artist 
despite the simultaneous awareness that the artist’s self-presentation is a product 
of very purposeful complication of authorship demonstrates the effect of the 
retrospective’s conditioning. Dompierre veers away momentarily from a more 
traditional understanding of authorship only to return to the book as another 
artwork granting private access to the personality of a mysterious public figure. 
This reflects the tendency recognized by Green in his critique of the art historical 
monograph, in which the “evocation of a life/temperament is interspersed with 
critical readings of the works produced.”130 The effect is that the relationship 
between Snow and his work is one of sincerity, that the “seemingly candid” 
representation of his life through images is a window into the personal before it is 
a critical obscuration of authorship, and the retrospective occasion generally. 
 This tendency is manifest in a number of analyses that follow in the essay. 
For example, while works Scope (1967) and Blind (1968) (discussed in depth in 
Monk’s essay) demand the viewer’s participation via their respective 
apparatuses,131 Dompierre argues that Snow’s sculptures from the 1980s (citing 
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Monocular Abyss (1982), Seated Sculpture (1982), and Zone (1982)) differ in that 
they evoke “a very pragmatic sense of the world…emphasizing Snow’s complex 
perception of the world at this particular time.”132 For Dompierre, this complex 
perception is in part an appreciation by Snow of the complexity of the “Real” and 
its relation to the camera; his sculpture and photographs after 1970 are comments 
on the inaccessible and fragmented Real as it comprises a promise (and failure) of 
the photographic lens. But while this conceptual argument promises to open 
Snow’s work to the notion of objective impossibility, it often redirects to a greater 
claim which positions Snow as being in touch with a kind of cultural zeitgeist, as 
his work “rises above the specific determinations of particular trends.”133 (We see 
an echo of Reid’s essay here, since the characterization of Snow as both 
participant in a greater art discourse must be balanced with his uniqueness, and 
dissociated from the purely popular.)  She criticizes Snow’s own claim that much 
of his photographic work attempts to be self-contained (there is “nothing outside” 
of the photograph) because it encourages a strict formalist approach; it tends to 
“restrict critical discussion to formal properties alone [and]…to confine such 
analysis to the arena of art itself, leaving out a broader basis and cultural 
understanding.”134 While this recognition introduces the discussion of Snow’s 
work to a wider cultural conversation, it instead uses the promise of the work’s 
cultural porousness to articulate it as evidence of artistic insight and worldly 
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perspective, rather than to institutional, economic, or other relations.135 Much of 
Dompierre’s analysis becomes enclosed then by the life of the artist, as it becomes 
a hard interpretive limit. Discussions of embodied viewing return to sculpture as 
reflective of Snow’s “sense of the world;” explorations of the limits of the “Real” 
become examples of Snow’s uniqueness and distance from “trend;” a criticism of 
strict formalism only opens readings insofar as it leaves room for Snow’s 
character and insight to become known. 
Kellman—mentioned earlier in the context of Monk’s essay—has 
identified a tendency in critical discourse surrounding Snow to do just this. Even 
when analysis looks beyond this argument for “tautology,” it returns to an 
implication of artist-as-origin. Writing in regard to art historical criticism around 
Authorization (1969) and Venetian Blind, she observes that the works are: 
(…) frequently analyzed…as tautological works in which form or process 
becomes content: they document the process of their own making or are so 
self-enclosed that conditions of production are the same as those of 
presentation. They present the self-realization of a generative principle; or 
present the event as its documentation and the whole returned uniquely to 
the mind and hand of Michael Snow who alone can authorize it. Implicit 
in these analyses are concepts of the return of form to the idea, the 
immanence of the enlivening idea in form and matter, and the origin of the 
idea as the genius of Michael Snow…this modernist criticism veers into 
romanticism because it does not take into account the subject matter in the 
images.136 
 
This critique applies to Monk’s reading of Authorization to be sure, but also 
describes the logic with which Dompierre—and the retrospective interpretive 
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framework as a whole—formulates her analysis as an argument about what 
Kellman later calls “the heroism of progress towards consciousness.”137 The essay 
interprets Snow’s artwork, in other words, as a progressive, private realization 
about the world, formalized through art. Dompierre mentions a work titled 
Conception of Light (1992), a large scale photographic installation showing two 
disembodied irises, one blue and one hazel staring unblinkingly at one other 
opposite ends of a room, in relation to earlier works: “The title,” Dompierre 
writes, “is meant to speak to how, materially, and at an interpretive level, the 
work embodies and manifests the position of the author and his particular 
perspective on the world in which we live.”138 Here again “embodied vision” is 
presented as not that of the viewer but of the artist himself; the experience of the 
work is then as an object of Snow’s (and second wife Peggy Gale’s) look. If 
Dompierre’s criticism of the tautological readings of Snow is based in a desire to 
introduce cultural considerations to the work, there remains an implied exclusion 
of the spectator’s body, inserted between the seemingly recursive “loop” of 
looking in Conception of Light as a result of this somewhat biographical 
commentary. At the end of the essay—after Dompierre has explored the related 
notions of a “plural self” in a “plural world,” the curator returns to Conception 
and adds that the irises are those of Snow himself and Gale; “that one of Snow’s 
own eyes (blue) has been used to make this work also brings us back full circle to 
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Venetian Blind, created some thirty-two years earlier.”139 “Full circle” in this 
sentence implies that Conception of Light—like Venetian Blind—is exceptional in 
its allowance of “speculation as to the artist’s inner state,” and even dramatic140 in 
its allusions to the artist’s relationship with his wife. Here the retrospective 
framing of Dompierre’s inquiry insists on another kind of tautology, where even a 
criticism aware of the complex nature of authorship (and especially in the work of 
Snow) must regardless yield to the conception of the artist as to some degree a 
unified point of origin, whose consciousness might be accessed by considering his 
works from this period in relation to one another, even as evolutionary in their 
insights.141 This consciousness is, even more, exemplary in its grasp of a certain 
contemporary condition, even prophetic in its deep understanding of collective, 
unconscious anxieties relating to television media and its relation to the Real. 
 So while the various objects of Dompierre’s inquiry speak to the 
recognition on the part of the artist of the infinite plurality of authorial voice (as in 
A Survey, Venetian Blind, and Authorization), the occasion of the inquiry direct 
analysis back to the implication of a singular, enlightened Snow. The curator’s 
walk through the past certainly explores critical tangents, but ultimately ends in 
the same destination: the characterization of Snow as a consistent critic of 
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contemporary consciousness, and a “private” subject whose disposition is 
revealed subtly through his art. The evolutionary logic of the modern museum 
resurfaces here in the form of the artist’s life-as-story, in which Snow conceives 
of, refines, and finally perfects an internal perceptive preoccupation. Not only 
this, but the refinement is revealed as simultaneously prophetic and responsive to 
circulating contemporary anxieties, while carefully eluding popular trends. The 
suggestion that the tautological readings of some works should be opened to 
include the “outside” serves only to reinforce such characterizations of Snow as 
his authorship indicates a place of conceptual origination. Finally, experiment, 
accident, play, and fiction as they relate to biography—as exemplified in Snow’s 
artist book A Survey, is by its very inclusion in the artist’s oeuvre in the 
retrospective context evacuated of its critical positioning as a comment not only 
on the 1970 retrospective, but the model of retrospective presentation itself. 
Despite the curator’s recognition that Snow’s work frequently concerns itself with 
the “idea of a de-centered subject…[and] the role of the image in the shaping of 
identity,”142 the artist is in effect re-centered by the various interpretive tendencies 
that work to direct analytic paths back to the life as generator of the work; the 
retrospective conditions, therefore, continue to press on active attempts, on the 
parts of both artist and curator, to circumnavigate them.   
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7| Conclusion 
This rhetoric of diversions with the return of a shared destination might 
describe the relations and tendencies across all three of the catalogue essays 
discussed here for The Michael Snow Project. Despite their separation being an 
implied answer to the perceived “character” of the retrospective, Reid, Monk, and 
Dompierre’s essays combine to demonstrate a number of general tendencies 
toward the centralization of the artist. More traditionally art historical, Reid’s 
chapter recovers Snow from historical inconsistencies, characterizes early work as 
prophetic for future innovations, and even looks—although with hesitation and 
awareness—to the artist’s date of birth as a source for “nascent talent.” His 
analysis amplifies artist statements as they confirm artistic meaning supportive of 
Snow’s originality, and silences this same voice when it confuses meanings, 
contradicts itself, or dissociates its practice too far from an existing canon. Monk 
and Dompierre—who investigate Snow’s later preoccupations with embodied 
vision—each employ a type of formalism, which presents works as perfected 
ideas, at once reflective of Snow’s inner states and in touch with deep 
philosophical and epistemological questions of his time. These readings position 
the viewer as spectator of Snow’s visions rather than as participants and co-
authors; they similarly treat Snow’s own criticism of his authorship as an abstract 
questioning of an ever elusive “Real” rather than as a comment on certain 
institutional presentations of biography. But what also joins these essays is the 
suggested consciousness of these very problems: Reid sees speculation, Monk 
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questions the nature of historical looking, and Dompierre recognizes the “plural 
self” that is Snow. The Michael Snow Project itself proposed an exhibition that 
was “retrospective in scale but not in character.” Besides the fact that the scale of 
a retrospective may very well be integral to its character (being that it is the 
prolific and careered artist who gets retrospective treatment), the question of the 
interpretive frames that define the model’s limits have become clear through a 
case study that attempts to work beyond its constraints. This confirms that these 
limits are present, persistent, and historically enduring.  
The nature of Snow’s work from the 1970s to the 1990s also begins to 
work against the modernist criteria that may have better defined his work in the 
1950s and 1960s. What does a traditional retrospective framing do to art practice 
that enters postmodernist themes and contemporary periodization? The example 
of Snow and The Michael Snow Project might not be so removed from more 
recent concerns about institutional presentations of contemporary art. Theorist T.J 
Demos has recognized a problem where an observed tendency away from fixed 
identity, or artistic “nomadism,” collides with the art market’s celebrity paradigm. 
He writes that: 
These tensions become particularly apparent when mid-career 
retrospectives are organized for the likes of [Rikrit] Tirivanija or Pierre 
Huyghe, exhibitions that deploy a monographic format that reaffirms 
authorial identity despite the artist’s attempts to variously problematize 
that logic via collaborative procedures, the elimination of art objects, or 
nonautobiographical projects.143 
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This reconfirmation of authorial identity is, of course, precisely that which defines 
the retrospective. As an artistic author in many ways between the canon and the 
contemporary (Snow is a living artist who has had several major retrospectives, 
both mid- and late career), Snow’s corpus also embodies a tension between the 
more formalist concern of modernism and more discursively critical aesthetic 
investigations that have in part defined contemporary practice. 
But critic J.J. Charlesworth has offered a more abrasive critique of this 
phenomenon, as evidenced in a recent article for Artnet titled “The Ego-Centric 
Art World is Killing Art.” In it he writes about the slippage between presentations 
of the “artist-as-ego” and the “ego-as-artist,” with the latter beginning to 
characterize both institutional exhibitions and art practice itself. The question here 
is about the degree to which habits of display—and the retrospective especially—
encourage the ego in art, thus sustaining the system of art stardom Charlesworth 
laments. We might also return to Jeremy Braddock’s concept of the provisional 
institution, as “a mode of public engagement modeling future” in which 
ideologies can be defined, packaged, and disseminated according to a certain 
curatorial vision. For Charlesworth, this future is defined by “the artist and the 
audience, holding hands between infinity mirrors, one hand free to squeeze off a 
selfie,”144 but this is also a vision of the art institution and its curators, standing 
just out of the mirror’s frame, continuing to buttress ego explorations as a means 
of drawing large crowds and adding value to their collections. The title of 
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Charlesworth’s article, after all, implies an art world-as-perpetrator, with art as its 
victim. 
And what is the future of authorship as it is modeled by the art world 
construction that is the retrospective? If anything, it is one that continues to 
reassert modern definitions of authorship analogous with those of which 
contemporary artists, if not art critics, are increasingly wary. Like the 
interpretations of The Michael Snow Project curators, the retrospective redirects 
discourse to the kind of author on which the art institution is built, despite the 
promise of the exhibition medium as a place of ideological reform. Now that the 
character of this discourse has been laid out, how can curatorial writing attend to 
some of these tendencies without abandoning all logic?  Can works from different 
authors and traditions be juxtaposed without insisting on a narrative of either 
conscious imitation or unconscious zeitgeist arguments? Is heterochronic display, 
which presents non- or counter-narratives compatible with the retrospective 
format? Can the exhibition allow for an encounter with an author while still 
privileging the meaning-making capacities of the spectator? Can exhibitions 
commemorate without deifying?  
 Two more recent texts on both the scholarship surrounding the author and 
the specific concerns explored in Snow’s work might provide some potential 
frameworks with which to reconsider the problems of retrospective format. One is 
Tila Kellman’s 2002 Figuring Redemption: Resighting My Self in the Art of 
Michael Snow discussed here with regard to the analyses put forth by Monk and 
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Dompierre. The other—mentioned briefly in the Literature Review—is Jane 
Gallop’s Deaths of the Author: Reading and Writing in Time. What these texts 
have in common is that they revisit authorship not with the animosity usually 
associated with New Criticism, but with an understanding mediated by a kind of 
democratic desire to dialogue with a text, to “witness” or “touch” the authoring 
body, even beyond its literal, biological death, and to construct both self and other 
in the space opened by the artwork. Recalling Kellman’s reading of Authorization, 
Snow’s artwork might be reconsidered as a “promise made to a reader” rather 
than a “declarative statement;” the receding and not quite graspable image of the 
artist, and the reflective surface of the mirror signal the both the look of desire 
cast by the spectator in a search for the author, and the “answer” in the form of 
one’s own image in a titillating “erotics” of self-exposure.145 For Kellman, it is 
this figuring of the self—myself, rather than purely Snow’s or the curator’s self—
that opens the artist’s work beyond the “monocular vision”146 associated with 
photography and in this case, the retrospective. This lens might even transform 
the satire of Charlesworth’s vision of the infinity mirror into something less 
skeptical: perhaps it is that virtual space of the mirror, the “holding hands with” or 
touching not the artist but her image—infinitely receding, unstable, and 
fractured—that offers an opportunity for self-making. 
 Gallop’s text applies the theme of desire more broadly in her re-visitation 
of authorship which begins with Barthes’s first questioning, but focuses instead 
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on a less analyzed statement by the poststructuralist in Sade, Fourier, Loyola: 
“The pleasure of the Text also includes a friendly return of the author.”147 So 
while the institutional definition of the author might be “dead,” desire for her 
persists. Reading the text is a pleasure in which the author “returns” but only as a 
kind of fantasy inside the text rather than outside or beyond it as “creator.” Gallop 
considers 
(…) this idea of the author as “lost in the text” very evocative. Not only 
does it suggest an author in the text but not in control, it also suggests the 
author might want to but cannot get out of the text. That idea…might be 
related to the idea…of the author who comes out of his text and into our 
lives. The image…could also suggest that he is there but the reader cannot 
find him, cannot reach him. If the relation of the author is a relation to an 
other, it is a relation to an other who is always there but always lost, who 
cannot be discounted but cannot be reached.148 
 
These characterizations of the author as “a lost other” without control grants the 
text—in this case, the artwork—a certain liveness.149 We cannot conclude the 
author nor fully access her by reading the text, but we can see her figuring—in a 
“certain” way—in the text; the author, in turn, desires her own textual re-creation 
by way of the reader. This relationship seems to broaden the “monoscopic” 
perspective, with the text operating not merely as a direct line to a biography, but 
instead considers the text itself as surface and depth—a space—where both artist 
and viewer can move. This is especially relevant to Snow’s directed vision; even 
if artists are clear in their biographical inquiries, explicit in their attempts to 
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“possess” sight, there is a curatorial responsibility to critically consider popular 
characterizations of artistic celebrity, perhaps in favour of the friendly co-
authorship Kellman promotes. Although, as we have seen, it is not only the 
spectator who co-authors, but the institution as well, desiring the artist author that 
is also a product of its historical making, trying to hold together its particular 
vision of the human subject, with the anxiety to do so exemplified and amplified 
in its regular deployment of the retrospective model. If contemporary curatorial 
practice begins with the exciting, if troubling concept of being “always there but 
always lost” in the text, if history need not be a consistently legible narrative, if 
the text is always live with the voice of an author rather than the author herself, 
then the retrospective may be able to carry on as a model compatible with the 
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